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Institutions that distort the e￿cient allocation of resources across ￿rms can have
a sizable e￿ect on economic outcomes. Hsieh and Klenow (2009), for example,
estimate that distortions in the Chinese economy reduce manufacturing produc-
tivity by 30 to 50 percent relative to an optimal distribution of capital and labor
across existing manufacturers. While research in this area often concentrates on
misallocation among existing ￿rms, distortions can also favor incumbents at the
expense of entrants. Trade barriers such as tari￿s and quotas can obviously distort
resource allocation along these ￿intensive￿ and ￿extensive￿ margins, and estimation
of the productivity growth associated with their removal is a traditional line of
inquiry in international trade. But gains from trade liberalization may be larger
than expected if the institutions created to manage the barriers impose their own,
additional drag on productivity. In that case, trade liberalization induces two
gains: the ￿rst from the elimination of the embedded institution, and the second
from the removal of the trade barrier itself.
In this paper, we examine productivity growth among Chinese exporters fol-
lowing the removal of externally imposed quotas. Under the global Agreement
on Textile and Clothing, previously known (and referred to in this paper) as the
Multi￿ber Arrangement (MFA), textile and clothing exports from China and other
developing economies to the US, the EU and Canada were subject to quotas until
January 1, 2005. In China, the licenses permitting ￿rms to export a portion of the
country’s overall quota were distributed by the government. We examine whether
this allocation created an additional drag on exporter productivity.
Our assessment of the extent to which China assigned export licenses on the
basis of ￿rm productivity is guided by an ￿auction-allocation￿ model derived from
Irarrazabal et al. (2010), who introduce per-unit tari￿s into the heterogeneous-
￿rm framework of Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008). Here, we interpret the speci￿c
tari￿ as a (common) quota license fee which ￿rms must pay in order to access re-
stricted foreign markets. This fee equates the supply and demand for quota. Firms
self-select into the quota-constrained export market based on their productivity,
as only the most productive exporters remain pro￿table net of the fee.
In the auction-allocation model, removal of quotas gives rise to three empirically
testable reactions. First, because per-unit license fees impose a greater distortion
2on low-price goods, exports of the most productive incumbents jump relative to
those of less productive incumbents. Second, because obtaining a costly export
license is no longer necessary, low-productivity ￿rms may enter the export market.
Third, incumbents and entrants make opposing contributions to export prices:
price declines among incumbents who no longer must pay a license fee are o￿set
by the relatively high prices of low-productivity entrants. In all three of these
reactions, the trends are dominated by incumbents.
We use ￿rm-level Chinese customs data to compare the growth of previously
quota-constrained Chinese textile and clothing goods to the growth of similar tex-
tile and clothing products exported quota free. This ￿di￿erence-in-di￿erences￿
comparison isolates the in￿uence of quota allocation from other factors a￿ecting
Chinese textile and clothing exports more broadly. Shipments of ￿cotton slips￿ to
the US, for example, were subject to quotas in 2004, while exports of ￿silk slips￿,
were not. Contrasting their growth in the years before and after quotas are re-
moved controls for shocks to supply, such as privatization, and shocks to demand,
such as changes in the preferences of consumers, that are plausibly common to
both goods.
Substantial deviations between the auction-allocation model and the data indi-
cate that the actual quota licenses assigned by the government were misallocated
with respect to ￿rm productivity. 1 We show that both the strong export growth
and the sharp price declines associated with quota removal are driven by net entry
rather than incumbents. More importantly, several trends indicate that entrants
were more productive than incumbents. First, their prices were on average 25
percent and 21 percent lower than incumbents and exiters, respectively, such that
net entrants accounted for 63 percent of the overall 18 percentage point decline
in relative prices. Second, entrants tended to emerge from the private sector and
gain market share at the expense of relatively unproductive incumbent state-owned
enterprises (SOEs). Finally, incumbents with the highest market share under quo-
tas experienced the largest decline in market share when quotas were removed.
This outcome contrasts starkly with the model’s predictionthat high-productivity
1We recognize that quota ￿misallocation￿ with respect to ￿rm productivity may re￿ect op-
timization with respect to other objectives of the government, such as balancing employment
across regions in China. To the extent that such objectives were relevant, our results can be
interpreted as measuring the cost of pursuing them in terms of exporter e￿ciency.
3incumbents bene￿t disproportionately from the removal of license fees. 2
In the second part of the paper we use results from our empirical analysis to
estimate the overall growth in exporter productivity associated with quota removal
as well as the contribution of eliminating misallocation. Inferring productivity
growth from changes in ￿rms’ quality-adjusted export prices, we ￿nd that aggregate
productivity among China’s textile and clothing exporters rose 7 percent upon
quota removal. This overall gain is large given that textiles and clothing represent
15 percent of China’s exports and 13 percent of its manufacturing employment.
To gauge the contribution of misallocation to this overall gain, we consider an
alternate ￿political allocation￿ scenario in which the government assigns export
licenses according to ￿rms’ ￿political connections￿ as well as their productivity.
Comparison of calibrated solutions to the auction and political allocation scenarios
implies that elimination of misallocated quotas raises the overall productivity gain
of quota removal by 28 percent.
Our ￿ndings relate most directly to the growing set of papers that use microdata
to estimate the e￿ects of market distortions on existing ￿rms (i.e., the ￿intensive￿
margin). These papers generally identify misallocation by comparing an outcome
such as the ￿rm-size or productivity distribution across countries, e.g., China versus
the US.3 While this approach provides valuable insight, it is necessarily coarse: any
deviation between outcomes is attributed to misallocation versus other di￿erences
between countries such as variation in product mix, technology or entrepreneurial
ability. Bloom and van Reenen (2007), for example, show that the distribution
of the latter may vary across counties if entrepreneurs in developing countries
are slow to adopt best practices. Likewise, as noted in Syverson (2011), these
aggregate comparisons do not identify the particular sources of distortions. Our
contribution to these e￿orts is threefold. First, we analyze reallocation between
existing and potential exporters. Second, we identify misallocation using relatively
weak assumptions: our di￿erence-in-di￿erences strategy requires only that the
distribution of technology and entrepreneurial ability be identical across similar
2We rely on indirect evidence of entrants’ relative productivity because we do not have the
data to measure exporters’ TFP directly. See Section 4 for more detail.
3See, for example, Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), and Alfaro et
al. (2008). Dollar and Wei (2007) investigate misallocation among Chinese ￿rms by comparing
the returns to capital across sectors and provinces in China.
4types of textile and clothing products within China, e.g., silk versus cotton slips.
Finally, our approach isolates the potential distortions caused by a speci￿c policy,
quota allocation.
The e￿ect of distortions on the extensive margin (e.g., ￿rm entry) is studied
most widely in the context of credit constraints in developing countries. Banerjee
and Du￿o (2004), for example, use an exogenous change in the supply of credit
to speci￿c ￿rms to identify constraints on obtaining credit among Indian ￿rms.
Their results suggest the existence of talented entrepreneurs who are prevented
from establishing ￿rms due to their inability to borrow from the formal banking
sector. Our contribution relative to these e￿orts is to gather data on a speci￿c
distortion a￿ecting the extensive margin, and to use it to estimate its e￿ects. We
￿nd that the Chinese government prevented the most productive Chinese textile
and clothing ￿rms from entering the export market, substantially reducing ag-
gregate productivity. To the extent that such restrictions were present in other
export markets, the economy-wide productivity loss associated with suppression
of the extensive margin (via barriers to entry) might have been quite large given
the importance of exports in China’s growth.
Finally, our results contribute to a large literature examining the costs of trade
protection.4 Standard analyses of these costs ignore misallocation along the exten-
sive margin. An exception is Anderson (1985), who shows that the deadweight loss
associated U.S. cheese quotas is understated if they are not assigned to the lowest-
cost countries. Our study is conceptually similar to Glaeser and Luttmer’s (2003)
examination of rent controls in the New York housing market, where the standard
deadweight loss of rationing apartments is accompanied by a further loss if apart-
ments are not assigned to the agents with the highest valuations. In both cases,
the gains from removing the distortion are ampli￿ed by eliminating the embedded
institution. Our results also provide support for the idea that externally man-
dated changes in trade policy can ignite broader reform by enabling governments
to overcome powerful domestic constituencies (Tang and Wei 2009).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 brie￿y presents a model
of quota allocation that is used to guide the empirical analysis. Section 3 o￿ers a
4See Feenstra (1992) for a cogent summary of this research. For recent empirical studies of
the MFA in particular, see Harrigan and Barrows (2009), Brambilla et al. (2010) and Bernhofen
et al. (2011).
5summary of the Multi￿ber Arrangement. Section 4 describes our data and Section
5 contains our empirical analysis. Section 7 explores alternative explanations for
our ￿ndings. Section 6 describes our counter-factual analysis. Section 8 concludes.
2 Theory
This section outlines a simple model of exporting under quotas to guide our empiri-
cal analysis. It assumes that quotas are allocated to the most productive exporters
via an auction. We emphasize two results. We show that while the removal of quo-
tas can induce less productive ￿rms to enter the export market, subsequent export
growth and price declines are driven overwhelmingly by the intensive margin. In
demonstrating these implications, we employ calibrated numerical solutions where
analytic results cannot be obtained.
2.1 Exporting Under Quotas
We rely on a re-interpretation of Irarrazabal et al. (2010), which analyzes exporting
by ￿rms with heterogeneous productivity in a trading system where importing
countries implement speci￿c (i.e., per unit) as well as ad valorem tari￿s. This model
is a version of the well-known monopolistic competition, love-of-variety framework
developed by Melitz (2003), which does not consider speci￿c tari￿s. 5
We assume that in order to export a quota-bound good from origin country o to
destination country d, ￿rms must pay a license fee (aod > 0) per unit exported as
well as an ad valorem tari￿ (τod > 1). As in Demidova et al. (2009) and Feenstra
(2004), we interpret quota license fees as equivalent to per-unit increases in the
cost of exporting.
Firm productivity φ is drawn from distribution G(φ) with density g(φ). The











5Given the number of papers relying on the Melitz (2003) framework, we keep our discussion
of the model in this section brief. We refer the reader to our appendix and Irarrazabal et al.
(2010) for more details.
6where σ > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution across varieties and ωo is the
wage in the origin country. The existence of the ￿nal term in this expression dif-
ferentiates it from its counterpart in Melitz (2003). It also provides a key intuition
for our analysis: a positive license price exerts a disproportionately higher penalty
on low-price (i.e., high-productivity) ￿rms. 6




where Yd is expenditure in the destination market and Pd is a price index de￿ned
over domestic producers and origin-country exporters in the destination country. In
Melitz (2003), the ratio of output produced by two ￿rms with productivity φ > φ′
is independent of ad valorem trade costs. Here, this independence is broken by
the addition of a speci￿c tari￿, with the result that reductions in the license fee
induce relatively greater growth among low-priced ￿rms.
We assume that the overall size of the origin-country export quota is determined
exogenously via bilateral negotiations between the two countries. Given this quota,
a Walrasian auctioneer determines the license price that induces ￿rms to export
the proper quantity, in aggregate. Intuitively, this license price will fall as the
quota rises. This setup is similar to that of Anderson (1985), who demonstrates
that the most e￿cient allocation of quotas implies a common license price.
Firms pay a ￿xed cost to enter the domestic market as well as the export market.
A productivity cuto￿, φ∗
od, determines the marginal exporter who is indi￿erent























where Pd = Pd(φ∗
od). Here, too, the ￿nal term di￿erentiates this expression from
the cuto￿ equation in a standard Melitz (2003) model: in the presence of a quota,
the productivity cuto￿ for exporting rises.
As discussed in Irarrazabal et al. (2010), there is no closed-form solution for
6In the data, ￿rm prices may vary due to quality as well as e￿ciency. We discuss this issue
in detail in Section 5.4.
7Pd when the license price is positive. With Pd ￿xed (i.e., with country o too
small to a￿ect prices in country d), it is easy to verify that decreasing the quota
reduces the productivity cuto￿ for exporting and thereby induces low-productivity
￿rms in country o to enter the export market. This entry drags down country
o’s unweighted average exporter productivity and raises its average export prices.
With respect to the margins of adjustment, the overall market share of incumbent
exporters declines but, among incumbent exporters, market share is reallocated
towards the (largest and) lowest-priced ￿rms.
More generally, Pd may rise or fall following quota removal depending upon
the distribution of ￿rm productivity. If the productivity of the most productive
￿rms is su￿ciently high, for example, export growth by the largest incumbents
may o￿set the in￿uence of entrants on quantity-weighted average productivity, or
prevent entry altogether. Assessing the impact of quota relaxation when Pd is not
￿xed requires numerical solutions, which we pursue in the next subsection.
2.2 Numerical Solutions
The model summarized above can be solved numerically to determine how export
prices and quantities as well as exporter productivity evolve as quotas are removed.
We provide a brief description of these solutions here, but refer the interested reader
to the appendix for further detail.
We consider two countries and one industry. The parameters of the model are:
σ, L = LChn,LUEC, G(φ) ∼ lnℵ(µ,θ), τ = {τChn,Chn,τChn,UEC,τUEC,Chn,τUEC,UEC},
f = {fChn,Chn,fChn,UEC,fUEC,Chn,fUEC,UEC}, ω = {ωChn,ωUEC}.7 We partition
this set by imposing values for some parameters and choosing the remaining pa-
rameters by matching particular statistics in the data. We assume that the two
countries have identical sizes LUEC = LChn = 100.8 We choose an elasticity of
substitution, σ = 4, that is the median among the apparel and textiles elastic-
7We set the domestic ￿xed costs fChn;Chn and fUEC;UEC so that all ￿rms are active in their





fUEC;UEC ) to match the fraction of textile and clothing exporters in each
market. We assume iceberg trade costs are equal to 1 within countries, ( τChn;Chn = τUEC;UEC =
1).
8As discussed below, we consider the quotas imposed by the U.S., Canada and the E.U. (the
￿UEC￿), whose total population (900 million) is relatively close to that of China (1.2 billion).
8ities estimated in Broda et al. (2006). We assume a log normal productivity
distribution, G(φ) ∼ lnℵ(µ,θ). We set the wage in each country equal to unity;
although this assumption appears strong, it simply implies that the iceberg and
￿xed trade costs that we match to the data capture variation in wages as well
as trade costs. We jointly choose the log normal mean and standard deviation,
the two iceberg trade costs (τChn,UEC and τUEC,Chn) and the ratios of exporting to
domestic ￿xed costs to match the following features of the data: the distribution
of exports among Chinese textile and clothing exporters, the share of Chinese tex-
tile and clothing producers that export and the Chinese and U.S. market shares
of U.S. and Chinese textile and clothing consumption in 2005, respectively. 9 The
resulting parameters are µ = 1.28, θ = 0.54, τChn,UEC = 1.80, τUEC,Chn = 3.55,
fChn,UEC/fChn,Chn = 1.15 and fUEC,Chn/fUEC,UEC = 1.15.
Using these parameters, we solve for the export productivity cuto￿s ( φ∗
Chn,UEC
and φ∗
UEC,Chn) and domestic price indexes (PUEC and PChn) in each country in a
no-quota equilibrium, i.e., where the license price is set to zero. We then re-solve
the model for a positive, common license price that yields the the 2004 level of
observed ￿quota restrictiveness￿, which we de￿ne as 1 minus the ratio of exports
under quotas to exports without quotas. In the data, the median growth of Chinese
exports of quota-restricted goods relative to unrestricted goods was 155 percent
in 2005 relative to 2004, implying a quota restrictiveness of 0.61 (1-1/2.55). 10 We
refer to this solution as the ￿auction allocation￿ of the quota licenses.
Table 1 compares numerical solutions of the model under the auction-allocation
and no-quota scenarios. The ￿rst two rows of the table compare the price indexes
9China’s Annual Survey of Industry collected by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)
reports that 44 percent of ￿rms in the textile and clothing sectors (Chinese Industrial Classi￿-
cations 17 and 18) exported in 2005. The share exports accounted for by the 75th, 90th, 95th,
99th and 99.9th percentiles of these exporters are 0.26, 0.46, 0.59, 0.80, 0.93 and 1, respectively.
We were unable to obtain import penetration ￿gures and fraction of textile exporters for Canada
and the EU, so we use the US data to determine the trade cost parameters. According to textile
and clothing production and trade data in the NBS production and Chinese customs data, re-
spectively, the U.S. market share of Chinese textile and clothing (China Industrial Classi￿cation
codes 17 and 18) consumption is 1.2 percent. According to the NBER Productivity Database,
the Chinese market share of U.S. apparel and textile consumption (NAICS codes 313, 314 and
315) is 13.1 percent. All data are from 2005 because that is the ￿rst post-quota year.
10This 155 percent growth rate is relative to quota-unconstrained textile and clothing exports
as well as to export growth of both types of exports in 2004, i.e., a ￿triple￿ di￿erence that is
explained in greater detail in Section 4.3. We assume this measure of quota restrictiveness is
independent of whether quotas are allocated e￿ciently or ine￿ciently in 2004.
9of the two countries. As expected, PUEC declines with the removal of quotas,
by 2 percent. This price decline is a function of the reallocation of exports to
higher-productivity ￿rms and the removal of the license fee. The entry of low-
productivity ￿rms is manifest in the decline of average productivity by 5 percent
in row three, while the more-than-o￿setting expansion of high-productivity ￿rms
is evident in the 24 percent increase of weighted average productivity in row four. 11
Similar movements occur in export prices in rows ￿ve through seven, where we ￿nd
incumbents account for virtually all of the 29 percent decline in Chinese export
prices following quota removal. The remaining rows of the table document the
disproportionate growth of the highest-productivity incumbents: while the largest
25 percent of ￿rms see their market share rise 17 percent, the market share of
the top 1 percent of ￿rms grows 82 percent. Despite the entry of new exporters,
incumbents only lose 1 percent of their market share (1 - 23.88/24.13) when the
quotas are removed. This small loss of overall incumbent market share is an
important implication of the auction allocation; its empirical analogue serves as a
key moment in our calibration of ￿political allocation￿ in Section 6.
3 A Brief Summary of the MFA
China’s textile and clothing industry accounts for a substantial share of its overall
economy. In 2004, it employed 12.9 million workers, or 13 percent of total manufac-
turing employment (2004 China Economic Census). China’s textile and clothing
exports account for 15 percent of the country’s overall exports, and 23 percent of
world-wide textile and clothing exports (which equaled $487 billion in 2005).
The Multi￿ber Arrangement (MFA) and its successor, the Agreement on Textile
and Clothing (ATC), grew out of restraints imposed by the U.S. on imports from
Japan during the 1950s. Over time, it evolved into a broader institution that
regulated the exports of clothing and textile products from developing countries to
the U.S., E.U., Canada, and Turkey. (We drop Turkey from the analysis because
11As noted in Irarrazabal et al. (2010), the large gains associated with the removal of licensing
fees exceed those implied by traditional trade models that solely consider the removal of iceberg
transportation costs (e.g., the class of trade models discussed in Arkolakis et al. 2010). The
size of the gain is also sensitive to the distribution from which productivity is drawn. As dis-
cussed further in footnote 30, if we follow the same procedure to solve the model using a Pareto
distribution for ￿rm productivity, we ￿nd a weighted-average productivity gain of 42 percent.
10we are unable to locate the list of products covered by its quotas; in 2004, textile
and clothing exports to Turkey accounted for less than 0.5% of China’s total textile
and clothing exports.) Bargaining over these restrictions was kept separate from
multilateral trade negotiations until the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1995,
when an agreement was struck to eliminate the quotas over four phases. At the
beginning of 1995, 1998, 2002 and 2005, the U.S., E.U. and Canada were required
to remove textile and clothing quotas representing 16, 17, 18 and the remaining 49
percent of their 1990 import volumes, respectively. The order in which goods were
placed into a particular phase varied across importers, with each country generally
choosing to place their most ￿sensitive￿ textile and clothing products into the ￿nal
phase (Phase IV) to defer politically painful import competition as long as possible
(Brambilla et al. 2010). This aspect of the liberalization suggests that the quotas
were most binding at the ￿nal removal of quotas on January 1, 2005. However, the
fact that Phase IV goods were determined in 1995 implies that their choice was
not in￿uenced by demand or supply conditions in 2005. 12
China did not become eligible for quota removal until it joined the WTO at
the end of 2001. In early 2002, its quotas on Phase I, II and III goods were relaxed
immediately. Removal of quotas on Phase IV goods ￿ the focus of our empirical
work ￿ occurred according to schedule on January 1, 2005. 13
Like other countries under the MFA and ATC, China o￿cially allocated quotas
on the basis of past performance, i.e., ￿rm’s ability to export their quota success-
fully in the previous year (Krishna and Tam 1998). As documented in Moore
(2002), however, China’s actual allocation of quotas deviated from this principle,
at times substantially. In the 1980s in particular, rent-seeking and political fa-
12The large increase in exports following quota removal in 2005 might be driven in part by
￿rms’ expectations that the MFA would be succeeded by another form of quantitative restrictions:
by boosting exports, ￿rms may have been hoping to receive a higher allocation under the new
regime. In fact, the U.S. and E.U. did reimpose safeguard quotas on a subset of products in 2005.
We have been unable to determine the products subject to safeguards in the E.U., but we ￿nd
that our results are unchanged if we exclude products subject to safeguards in the U.S. market
in 2005.
13The removal of quotas coincided with China’s obligation under its WTO accession agreement
to eliminate export licensing in all products by 2005. The products that were subject to state
trading and designated traders are listed in Appendix 2A2 and 2B of China’s WTO accession
document (WT/ACC/CHN/49), respectively. In 2004, these products account for just 1 percent
of total textile and clothing export value to the U.S., E.U. and Canada in 7 percent of the product
codes. The results of our analysis are unchanged if we exclude these products from the analysis.
11voritism were rampant. Firms managed by individuals a￿liated with the People’s
Liberation Army, for example, received quotas in return for their support of the
government, and these allocations were increased in 1989 following the army’s back-
ing of the state during the Tiananmen crisis. Likewise, there is evidence that the
central Ministry of Commerce provided quota allocations to provincial authorities
in an e￿ort to promote textile and clothing manufacturing geographically (Min-
istry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 2001). Our analysis is unable
to identify the precise objective function that the government sought to maximize,
but by considering the deviation in the actual quota assignment from one that
assigned quotas on the basis of ￿rm productivity, our analysis quanti￿es the cost
of pursuing an allocation of quotas based on alternative criteria.
Although trading quotas in China was illegal throughout the MFA, anecdotal
evidence suggests that an active black market emerged during the 1980s. One
consequence of the di￿culties associated with ￿rms’ inability to trade quotas legally
was unused quota. To prevent quota from going unused, the government stepped
up enforcement of allocations based on past performance, and tried to prevent non-
producing ￿rms from receiving quotas (Moore 2002). These reforms are generally
believed to have reduced black-market activity, though veri￿cation of this claim is
di￿cult given ￿rms’ (understandable) reluctance to discuss illegal trading (Moore
2002; interviews conducted by the authors). The illegality of a secondary market
is likely to have frustrated the resale of quotas, implying that quotas may not have
found their way to agents who valued them the most. The potential sensitivity of
our results to legal or illegal subcontracting, as well as empirical exercises designed
to measure it, are discussed further in Section 7.
Starting in 2000, the government experimented with allowing some ￿rms to
participate in auctions of up to 30 percent of the total quota allocation of some
MFA goods. Unfortunately, we have been unable to determine the precise criteria
the government used to select ￿rms to participate in these auctions.
4 Data
Our empirical analysis relies on data from several sources. The ￿rst is Chinese cus-
toms data by ￿rm, eight-digit Harmonized System (HS) category and destination
12country. For each ￿rm-product-country observation, we observe the total nominal
value and quantity exported as well as whether ￿rms fall into one of three own-
ership categories: state-owned enterprises (￿SOEs￿), domestically owned private
￿rms (￿domestic￿) and foreign-invested private ￿rms (￿foreign￿). 14 Quantity units
are available for 99 percent of observations accounting for the same share of export
value, and vary across products, e.g., dozens of shirts or square meters of fabric.
We combine the nominal value and quantity data to construct nominal unit values,
also referred to as ￿prices￿.
We focus on China’s exports of textile and clothing products to the U.S.,
Canada and the E.U., treating the latter as a single block of countries given
that quotas are set for the union as a whole. Product-country pairs are parti-
tioned into two groups. The ￿rst, referred to as ￿MFA￿ product-country pairs,
encompass textile and clothing products bound by quotas until 2004. The remain-
ing product-country pairs, referred to as ￿OTC￿, for ￿other textile and clothing￿
product-country pairs, consist of textile and clothing products exported quota-
free.15 Because our classi￿cation refers to product-country pairs, it is possible for
a given HS product to be both MFA and OTC depending upon its destination.
For example, a textile and clothing product subject to a quota only in the U.S.
exported to the U.S., is MFA, but if it is exported to the E.U., is OTC. 16 Among the
547 products that are subject to quotas by any of the U.S., the E.U. or Canada,
157 are subject to quotas by all three destinations, while 167, 63, and 4 are subject
to quotas solely in the U.S., solely in the E.U. and solely in Canada, respectively.
14We classify ￿state-owned￿ ￿rms as SOEs; ￿collective-owned￿, ￿other￿ and ￿private domestic￿
￿rms as domestic, and ￿foreign-exclusive owned￿ and two joint venture classi￿cations as foreign.
15Textile and clothing products are de￿ned as: two-digit HS chapters 50-63; four-digit HS
chapter 6406; ￿ve-digit HS chapters 30059, 65059 and 94049; and six-digit HS chapter 701919.
MFA products are a subset of these HS chapters and are de￿ned according to a concordance made
available by the Embassy of China’s Economic and Commercial A￿airs o￿ce which identi￿es the
set of products subject to quotas in each destination market in 2004. Note that some products in
the OTC category were subject to quotas that were removed in 2002 under earlier phases of the
quota liberalization. Comparisons of the trends noted in the text to goods outside of textiles and
clothing, as well as textile and clothing exports to the rest of the world, appeared in an earlier
version of this paper and are available upon request.
16A particular ￿rm may appear in more than one group if it exports to multiple countries or if
it exports more than HS category. We ￿nd that 86 percent of MFA ￿rms in 2004 export at least
one of their MFA HS categories to at least one quota-free country (e.g., Japan). These ￿rms
represent 77 percent of MFA export value in 2004. The comparable ￿gure for OTC ￿rms and
OTC export value are 40 and 65 percent, respectively.
13We assess the extent to which quotas were allocated to the most productive
￿rms by examining changes in MFA exports before and after quotas were removed
on January 1, 2005 using outcomes in OTC as well as prior years as controls.
These comparisons capture broad trends a￿ecting China’s textile and clothing
exports during this period, such as improvements in productivity or privatization,
and our ability to make use of them is a unique advantage of our analysis.
A more direct approach to identifying misallocation of quotas would be to com-
pare the estimated TFP of ￿rms assigned quotas in 2004 to those which export
freely in 2005. In principle, this comparison could be accomplished by matching
￿rms’ trading behavior in the customs data to information on their output and in-
puts recorded in China’s annual survey of manufacturing collected by the National
Bureau of Statistics (NBS). In practice, matching these two datasets is di￿cult. 17
Another alternative would be to use the indicator for ￿rms’ export status in the
NBS production data to determine their participation in quota-constrained export
markets. Unfortunately, this indicator cannot be used to distinguish between MFA
and OTC exports because it neither records the countries to which ￿rms export
nor the speci￿c HS codes exported. The only industry information available in the
NBS is a code for ￿rms’ major line of business.
5 Reallocation Following Quota Removal
The model developed in Section 2 highlights three empirical implications of the
removal of auction-allocated quotas: a reallocation of export market share towards
the largest, most productive incumbents; a reduction in incumbents’ export prices
due to the removal of license fees; and the entry of less-productive but higher-priced
exporters. We ￿nd substantial di￿erences between the data and the predictions of
the auction-allocation model.
17Matching must be done using ￿rm names rather than numerical identi￿ers. We have suc-
ceeded in matching 9,558 (31 percent) of the 2005 MFA and OTC exporters to the NBS pro-
duction data. These exporters account for 35 percent of total MFA and OTC export value. By
ownership type, we match 9 (6), 19 (30) and 58 (77) percent of SOE, domestic and foreign ￿rms
(value), respectively. We suspect that very low match rate for SOEs is due to their use of a
trading division to export. As discussed further in Section 7.2, this suspicion is strengthened
by relatively high prevalence of the phrase ￿trading company￿ in their names despite their being
included in the NBS, which purportedly tracks producers.
145.1 Export Growth Following Quota Removal
Chinese export growth in 2005 is disproportionately large for textile and clothing
goods released from quotas, and generally occurs at the expense of state-owned
enterprises.
As indicated in the top panel of Table 2, MFA product-countries registered
a 307 percent increase in export value between 2000 and 2005. By comparison,
export growth is 205 percent for OTC and 236 percent for Chinese exports as a
whole. MFA’s di￿erentially large growth is due primarily to the 119 percent jump
in export value that occurs in 2005, the year that quotas are removed. Its annual
growth in prior years, by contrast, averages just 17 percent. 18
Data in the lower panel of Table 2 indicates that the surge in MFA export
value in 2005 is accompanied by a 96 percent increase in the number of MFA
exporters. Here, too, this jump is large relative to prior years as well as the 39
percent increases in OTC exporters over the same period. This relative growth in
the number of exporters provides the ￿rst indication of the potential importance of
the extensive margin in MFA’s response to quota removal. We also ￿nd that MFA
export growth is uneven across ownership types: SOEs account for 54 percent
of MFA in 2004 versus 44 percent for OTC. Once quotas are removed, Table 3
shows that this gap falls markedly: in 2005, SOEs’ market share is 38 percent in
MFA and 36 percent in OTC. Together, these facts highlight three trends about
MFA exports following quota removal. First, MFA export growth is relatively high
compared to previous years and to OTC, indicating that MFA quotas were binding.
Second, growth in MFA export value is accompanied by a similarly large increase
in the number of MFA exporters, which suggests a prominent role for the extensive
margin. Finally, the reallocation of market share away from publicly owned SOEs
and towards privately owned domestic and foreign ￿rms suggests that SOEs may
have received an excessive level of quota under the MFA.
The transfer of MFA market share between ownership types can be used to
compute a coarse, back-of-envelope estimate of the productivity gain associated
with the replacement of SOEs by privately owned ￿rms. Using the NBS produc-
18U.S., E.U. and Canadian quotas on China’s MFA export quantities grew an average of 2 to
3 percent per year once China was admitted to the WTO in December 2001 (Brambilla et al.
2010). The relatively high value growth displayed before 2004 in Table 2 re￿ects a combination
of this growth in quantity as well as sizable increases in prices.
15tion data we compute the relative productivity of exporters by ￿rm ownership type,
restricting our comparison to exporters in 2005 whose major line of business is tex-
tiles or clothing (industry codes 17 or 18). Figure 1 plots the resulting distributions
of textile and clothing exporters’ TFP relative to the hypothetical average textile
and clothing ￿rm by type of ownership. 19 SOE exporters’ distribution lies clearly
to the left of the distributions of privately owned exporters. The ￿rst column of
Table 4 reports each ownership type’s TFP relative to the hypothetical mean from
Figure 1. On average, SOEs are 18 percent less productive than the hypothetical
mean exporter, while privately owned domestic and foreign exporters are 88 and
72 percent more productive. These estimates are consistent with broader mea-
sures of TFP di￿erences among state- and privately owned ￿rms found by Brandt
and Zhu (2010) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009). The second column reports the
relative changes in each ownership type’s market share between 2004 and 2005.
Multiplying through, we ￿nd that the reallocation of market shares observed in
2005 implies an increase in exporters’ TFP of 13.5 percent. This estimate relies on
the strong assumption that ￿rm productivity is constant within ownership types,
which is at odds with Figure 1 and additional evidence on export prices presented
below. Below, we derive an alternate estimate of aggregate productivity growth
associated with quota removal that relaxes this assumption.
5.2 Margins of Adjustment
We ￿nd that export growth following quota removal favors privately owned entrants
primarily at the expense of incumbent SOEs.
Export growth can be decomposed into one intensive and two extensive mar-
gins. The intensive margin is populated by incumbents, by which we mean eight-
digit HS products exported by the same ￿rm to the same country in both 2004
and 2005. The extensive margin is comprised of entrants and exiters. Entrants
19We follow Brandt et al. (2009) in estimating ￿rm f’s TFP using a T￿rnqvist index number
approach, ln(TFPf) = (vaf −va)−  sf(wf −w)−(1−  sf)(kf −k), where vaf, wf, and kf are in
logs and denote ￿rm value added, wages and ￿xed assets (net of depreciation),   sf = (sf + s)/2,
sf is the share of wages in total value added, and where a bar over a variable denotes an average
across all textile and clothing exporters. TFP for each ￿rm is relative to a hypothetical ￿rm with
the average output and inputs. Wages are de￿ned as reported ￿rm wages plus employee bene￿ts
(unemployment insurance, housing subsidies, pension and medical insurance), and capital is
de￿ned as reported capital stock at original purchase price less accumulated depreciation.
16are ￿rm-product-country triplets which appear in 2005 but which were not present
in 2004. Exiters exhibit the opposite pattern. Given these de￿nitions, multiple-
product exporters may be counted in more than one margin of adjustment, e.g.,
they may exit one product-country and enter another.
We examine reallocation in terms of quantity- rather than value-based mar-
ket share due to the large price changes documented in the next section. Under
the auction-allocation scenario presented in Section 2, export growth following
quota removal should be concentrated among the largest incumbents due to their
(presumed) greater productivity. Instead, we ￿nd the opposite. Figure 2 plots
the locally weighted least squares relationship between incumbents market share
within their product-country pair in 2004 and their change in this market share be-
tween 2004 and 2005. Separate relationships are plotted for each ownership type,
by group. The negative relationships across ownership-group pairs likely re￿ects
mean reversion. However, this decline is more pronounced in MFA than OTC, and
most severe for SOEs within MFA. This result provides further indication that
SOEs received excessive allocations under quotas. 20
A formal decomposition of 2004 to 2005 MFA quantity market share reallo-
cation by margin of adjustment is presented in the ￿rst panel of Table 5. It is
constructed by determining the quantity market share of each margin ( m) within











taking the di￿erence between years and then averaging these di￿erences across the
product-country pairs. Di￿erences are in bold if they are statistically signi￿cantly
di￿erent from zero at the 10 percent level.
The left panel of Table 5 summarizes the ￿single-di￿erence￿ shift in market
share from incumbents to net entrants within MFA from 2004 to 2005 as quotas
are removed. Entrants are decomposed into ￿new exporters￿, which are ￿rms that
did not export at all in 2004, and ￿adders￿, which are ￿rms that exported one or
more other (potentially MFA) products in 2004 prior to adding an MFA product in
2005.21 Incumbents’ market shares decline by an average of 21 percentage points
20We note that the strong role of the extensive margin might be explained by capacity con-
straints among incumbents as quotas are removed. While this explanation is plausible, it seems
unlikely given that the dates of quota removal were known ten years in advance, providing in-
cumbents with ample time to prepare.
21A given ￿rm may contribute to both the intensive and ￿adder￿ extensive margins if it both
17across product-destination pairs in the year quotas are removed. This decline is
(necessarily) o￿set by a 21 percentage-point average gain by net entrants, for an
overall average change of zero. Of this 21 percentage-point gain, adders and new
exporters contribute 65 and 6 percent, respectively, while exiters account for -50
percent.
The remaining columns of the left panel of Table 5 decompose the overall
￿single-di￿erence￿ change in MFA market share for each margin by type of ￿rm
ownership. Each row sums to the value in the ￿rst column of the panel. Two
trends stand out. First, there is substantial gross reallocation of market share
within each ownership type. This gross reallocation emphasizes ￿rm heterogeneity
within each type of ownership and is most pronounced among SOEs, where the
relatively high 32 percent market share lost by exiters is o￿set by a 26 percent
market share gain by adders. Second, there is a net 21.9 percent reallocation of
market share from SOEs to privately owned domestic (13.4 percent) and foreign
(8.5 percent) entrants.22 Together, these gross and net reallocations suggest that
the ￿excessive￿ quota enjoyed by some state-owned enterprises in 2004 came at the
expense of both other SOEs as well as privately owned ￿rms.
The ￿single￿ di￿erences reported in the left panel of Table 5 do not reveal the
extent to which 2004 to 2005 changes in MFA margins’ market shares deviate
either from changes in OTC over the same period, or from these groups’ changes
in the prior period. Such ￿triple￿ di￿erences control for factors common to Chinese
textile and clothing products over time such as the removal of entry barriers and
the broad-based decline of SOEs. Triple di￿erences are estimated via the following
product-country level OLS regression:
∆Θmhct = α0 + α11{t=2005} + α21{hc ∈ MFA} (4)
+ α31{t=2005} × 1{hc ∈ MFA} + emhct,
where 1{t=2005} and 1{hc ∈ MFA} are indicators for 2005 and the presence of a
continues exporting at least one MFA product between 2004 and 2005 and adds another MFA
product during that interval. For more detail, see the appendix.
22Price changes explain the di￿erence between the 21 percent decline in SOEs average quantity-
based market shares in Table 5 and their 16 percent decline in value-based market share in Table
3.
18product-country pair in group MFA, respectively. The sum of all four coe￿cients
equals the ￿single￿ di￿erences reported in the left panel of Table 5. By itself, α3
represents the triple di￿erences reported in the right panel of Table 5. Complete
regression results are reported in Table 10 of the appendix.
Triple di￿erences convey the same basic message as the single di￿erences, i.e.,
a strong reallocation of market share away from incumbent SOEs and towards
privately owned entrants. This reallocation is inconsistent with quota removal
under the auction model developed in Section 2 as well as the relatively high
apparent productivity of entrants discussed below. 23
5.3 Prices
MFA export prices fall substantially when quotas are removed, largely due to net
entry.
We compute the change in groups’ export prices in two steps. First, for each
product-country (hc) pair in each year (t), we calculate a weighted-average export
price (P hct) across all ￿rms’ log export unit values, ln(pfhct), using their quantity





Then, for each product-country pair, we compute the change in this log price
between years,
∆ ¯ Phct =
(
P hct − P hct−1
)
. (6)
Each bar in Figure 3 displays the mean of ∆ ¯ Phct across all product-country pairs in
23In unreported results (available upon request), we ￿nd even stronger reallocation from SOE
incumbents to privately owned entrants among product-country pairs where quotas are binding,
i.e., where ￿ll rates exceed 90 percent. Data on U.S., E.U. and Canadian ￿ll rates are obtained
from OTEXA, SystŁme IntØgrØ de Gestion de Licenses, and Foreign A￿airs and International
Trade Canada, respectively. We also ￿nd virtually identical triple-di￿erence results after includ-
ing product and country ￿xed e￿ects, which control for trends in prices and identify changes
within these groups between 2003 to 2004 and 2004 to 2005.
24We use log prices to minimize the in￿uence of outliers and to facilitate decomposition of
observed prices into quality-adjusted prices below. Results are qualitatively similar if we drop
outliers, i.e., product-country groups with the highest and lowest 1 percent of price changes.
19MFA and OTC for 2004 and 2005. As indicated in the ￿gure, MFA export prices
on average fall by 0.179 log points, while OTC exports on average rise by 0.065 log
points. The MFA decline is also sharp relative to the group’s average price growth
of 0.01 log points in 2004.
Variation in normalized log export prices among MFA incumbents, entrants
and exiters is displayed visually in Figure 4, which plots incumbents’ and entrants’
normalized 2005 log export prices and exiters’ normalized 2004 log export prices.
In both cases the normalization involves subtracting o￿ the across-year log mean





P hct + P hct−1
)
. (7)
Firms whose relative prices are below and above the ￿rst and ninety-ninth per-
centiles of each distribution, respectively, are removed from the ￿gure to increase
readability.
The ordering of the price distributions, with entrants to the left and exiters
to the right, indicates that ￿rms exiting MFA in 2004 have relatively high prices
compared to 2005 entrants. On average, entrants’ prices are 0.25 and 0.21 log
points lower than incumbents’ and exiters’ prices, respectively. By comparison, the
top and bottom panels of Figure 5 reveal that we do not ￿nd a similar ordering of
entrants’ and exiters’ prices either contemporaneously in OTC or in MFA the year
before. A second notable feature of Figure 4 is MFA incumbents’ relatively thin
left tail. This paucity of very low prices provides intuition for the loss of market
share by incumbents discussed in the previous section. Indeed, incumbents’ ability
to retain as much market share as they did given their relatively high prices may
be due to market or policy asymmetries such as long-term contracts or better
marketing information that give high-priced incumbents an advantage over low-
priced entrants.
We quantify the relative importance of each margin in MFA price changes
using a technique for productivity decomposition proposed by Griliches and Regev
(1995):






































As above, θ represents quantity-based market share and f, h and c index exporters,
eight-digit HS categories and countries, respectively. I, N and X correspond to
the sets of incumbent, entering (new exporters plus adders) and exiting ￿rms,
respectively. (We forgo breaking entrants into adders versus new exporters given
the relatively small market share of the latter in Table 5.) θfhc is the average market




/2. Finally, pfhc =
1
2 (lnpfhct + lnpfhct−1)/2 is the across-year average price of ￿rm f in product-
country hc. Like θfhc, it can be computed only for incumbents.
The ￿rst term in square brackets captures the intensive margin. Its ￿rst,
￿within￿ component measures the price change of incumbent exporters holding
their market share ￿xed. Its second, ￿across￿ component accounts for changes in
incumbents’ market shares, weighting those changes by the di￿erence between a
￿rm’s average across-year price and the overall average across-year price. If in-
cumbents’ prices fall with the quota fee, the within component is negative. If
incumbents’ prices are relatively high and their market shares tend to decline, the
across component is also negative and both components contribute to a reduction
in ∆ ¯ Phct.
The second term in square brackets in equation (8) captures the entry mar-
gin; this term is negative if entrants’ prices are lower than the across-year average
price. The third term in square brackets captures the exit margin. Its interpre-
tation is analogous to the entry term, as it is positive if exiters have relatively
high prices compared to the across-year average. Note that because the exit mar-
gin is subtracted from the previous two margins, positive values make a negative
contribution to the overall price change.
We use regressions analogous to equation (4) to estimate single- and triple-
21di￿erence price decompositions. Complete regression results are reported in Table
11 of our appendix and are summarized in the two panels of Table 6 using the same
format as with market shares above. Here, triple di￿erencing controls for in￿ation
(our value data are nominal) as well as other factors such as changes in technology
and exchange rates that a￿ect the prices of all Chinese textile and clothing export
prices equally.
As results for single and triple di￿erences are quite similar, we discuss the latter.
We ￿nd that incumbents are responsible for just over one-third (37 percent) of the
average 0.179 relative log point decline in MFA export prices in 2005. The within
and across components of this adjustment reveal that most of this drop is due
to loss of market share by relatively high-priced incumbents (-0.042) versus price
declines (-0.025), but that both are sizable. The extensive margin accounts for
the remaining 63 percent of the overall price decline, with entrants’ relatively low
prices and exiters’ relatively high prices contributing 39 and 24 percent on average,
respectively.
More so than with market share changes, price changes are the result of both
gross and net reallocations within and across ownership types. Price declines and
loss of market share by incumbent SOEs account for one-fourth over the overall
drop in prices (-0.052/-0.179). Net entry by SOEs not favored by quota allocation
in 2004 contributes another fourth (-0.51/-0.179), with entry and exit contributing
roughly equal amounts. Finally, entry by low-priced privately owned ￿rms con-
tributes another third (-0.062/-0.179). To the extent that low prices re￿ect high
productivity, these trends are inconsistent with allocation of quotas to the most
productive ￿rms under the MFA.
5.4 Quality, Quality-Adjusted Prices and Productivity
Long-standing research on quotas discusses ￿rms’ incentives to increase product
quality when quotas are imposed and decrease it when they are removed (Aw and
Roberts 1986, Feenstra 1988 and Boorstein and Feenstra 1991). This incentive
comes from the relatively high penalty quotas exert on low-price ￿ here interpreted
as low-quality ￿ goods. From a quality perspective, the relative price declines
documented above may re￿ect quality downgrading by incumbents and the entry
and exit of low- and high-quality textile and clothing varieties, respectively.
22We estimate export ￿quality￿ (λfhct) by embedding preference for it in the CES















Taking logs and using the elasticity of substitution σ = 4 from Section 2.2, we use
the residual from the following OLS regression to infer quality:
lnqfhct + 4lnpfhct = αh + αct + ϵfcht, (10)
where ˆ λfcdt ≡ ˆ ϵfcht/(σ−1). The intuition behind this approach is straightforward:
conditional on price, a variety with a higher quantity is assigned higher quality. 25
By imposing the same elasticity of substitution across textile and clothing products,
we avoid having to estimate demand before inferring quality. In our estimation, αct
collects both the destination price index (Pct) and income (Yct). The product ￿xed
e￿ect αh is included because prices and quantities are not necessarily comparable
across product categories. The quality-adjusted price is the observed log price less
estimated quality, which is already in logs.
Table 7 decomposes MFA quality changes by margin of adjustment and owner-
ship type using the same format as previous decompositions. The single-di￿erence
results in the left panel indicates an average increase in overall MFA quality across
hc pairs of 0.044 log points. Consistent with the quota literature, however, the
triple-di￿erence results in the right panel indicate an average decline in relative
MFA quality of -0.109 log points. SOE and privately owned domestic ￿rms are
25See Hummels and Klenow (2005), Khandelwal (2010), Hallak and Schott (2011) and Feenstra
and Romalis (2011). We infer quality from the demand side and do not specify a model that
accounts for ￿rm quality choice (e.g., Kugler and Verhoogen (forthcoming) and Johnson (2010)).
Here, quality is de￿ned very broadly: it is anything that raises consumer demand for a product
other than price. This method for inferring quality downgrading within products, also used by
Broda and Weinstein (2010), di￿ers from the across-product approach adopted by Harrigan and
Barrows (2009) and developed by Aw and Roberts (1986) and Boorstein and Feenstra (1991).
In their approach, quality downgrading is de￿ned as a shift in consumption from high- to low-
priced HS categories over time, as identi￿ed by a relative decrease in a quantity-weighted versus
value-weighted average price index. We follow our approach to identify quality changes because
across-product evidence of quality downgrading does not account for quality changes within HS
categories or within ￿rms, which our data can address directly.
23the major source of this decline: they account for half of the overall drop (-0.052/-
0.109) and their contribution is statistically signi￿cant. While the results in the
remaining cells of the table are consistent with low-quality entrants replacing high-
quality exiters, they are not statistically signi￿cant except for the combined net
entry of privately owned domestic ￿rms, which accounts for another third of the
overall decline (-0.032/-0.109).
Subtracting the decomposition in Table 7 from the decomposition in Table
6 yields the decomposition of quality-adjusted prices reported in Table 8. The
triple di￿erences in the right panel of the table reveal that MFA prices continue to
exhibit a statistically signi￿cant relative price decline of -0.070 log points even after
adjusting for quality. Likewise, net entry by low-price ￿rms of each ownership type
continues to account for a substantial and (jointly) statistically signi￿cant portion
(-0.055/-0.070) of this overall decline. In fact, the extensive margin’s contribution
to the decline in quality-adjusted price changes (79 percent) is even higher than
its contribution to observed price changes (63 percent; Table 6).
As indicated in the pricing rule from Section 2.2 (equation 1), changes in in-
verted quality-adjusted prices provide information about changes in ￿rm produc-
tivity. Assuming the Chinese government awarded quotas without charging a fee
from recipients (i.e., aChina,US = 0), the quality-adjusted price changes reported
in Table 6 indicate that quota removal coincides with an average 0.070 log point
increase in productivity across hc pairs.26 While this productivity growth is con-
sistent with the auction-allocation scenario in Section 2.2, entrants’ contribution
to it starkly violates the implication that new exporters be of lower productivity
than incumbents. More than half of the total gain in productivity is due to entry
(0.039/0.070), with SOEs and privately owned domestic ￿rms contributing most
of it. This estimated 0.070 log point gain in productivity is large relative to other
estimates in the literature.27 Brandt and Zhu (2010), for example, estimate aver-
age annual TFP growth of 4 percent for non-agricultural industries over 1998 to
2007.
The growth in productivity revealed by changes in quality adjusted prices rep-
resents the total gain from quota removal. In the next section we make use of
26Since the price changes are in logs, multiplying through by -1 yields productivity.
27We ￿nd an increase in aggregate productivity of 0.069 log points if we weight hc pairs by
export value.
24numerical solutions of the model to decompose this overall gain into the part due
to misallocation versus the part accounted for by the removal of the quota.
6 Decomposing Productivity Gains
The empirical analysis in Section 5 demonstrates that the Chinese government
did not allocate export quotas according to ￿rm e￿ciency. To determine the
drag on exporter productivity induced by this misallocation, we need to compare
the actual allocation mechanism used by the government to the (counterfactual)
auction-allocation mechanism. We approximate the government’s process for allo-
cating quota licenses via a simple ￿political-allocation￿ scenario designed to match
fundamental features of the data. We then compare the weighted-average produc-
tivity of exporters under this scenario to the weighted-average productivities found
for both the auction-allocation and no-quotas models in Section 2.2.
The political-allocation scenario is constructed to match three key outcomes
in the data following the removal of quotas in 2005: the growth in MFA export
volumes, the growth in the number of MFA exporters, and the decline in incumbent
market share. We ￿t the ￿rst two of these trends exactly and use the third to pin
down the extent of the government’s misallocation under political allocation.
We assume that the aggregate quota imposed on China is the same under
auction and political allocation, and therefore use the same quota restrictiveness
(0.61) employed in Section 2.2. We choose the number of exporters that receive
quotas under political allocation, NPA, to match the 65 percent relative growth in
MFA exporters observed in 2005 (Table 2),
NNQ − NPA
NPA = 1.65, (11)
where NNQ is the number of exporters found in the no-quota scenario in Section
2.2.
In Section 5 we found that the decline in incumbent market share between
2004 and 2005 is key evidence in favor of misallocation. As a result, we need the
political allocation scenario to assign quotas to enough low-productivity ￿rms so
that their dropping out of the export market once quotas are removed matches the
25data. Toward that end, we assume that export shares are allocated on the basis
of a second random ￿rm draw, κ, that has rank correlation ρ with the productiv-
ity draw, φ, they recieved in the auction-allocation model in Section 2.2. 28 We
interpret this second source of ￿rm heterogeneity as a measure of ￿rms’ ability to
obtain quota from the government, perhaps due to political connections. As with
productivity, we assume that ￿rms are ￿endowed￿ with their political connection
and ignore any deadweight loss associated with potentially unproductive bribery
or lobbying to obtain their political connection (Bhagwati 1982). For a given ρ, we
sort ￿rms according to κ and assign the 2004 export shares observed in the data
to the top NPA of these ￿rms, from high to low. 29
Exporters’ weighted-average productivity under political allocation is governed
by ρ. Indeed, the magnitude of ρ is an indication of misallocation: the further
its distance from 1, the less the resulting allocation is based on φ. We choose ρ
so that the change in incumbents’ market share between the political-allocation
and no-quota scenarios matches the observed 16.7 percent relative decline in MFA
incumbents’ market share in 2005 (Table 5, right panel).
This match occurs at ρ = 0.67, implying a political-allocation weighted-average
productivity of 3.26. This productivity is lower than the weighted-average produc-
tivities of 3.43 and 4.21 found for the auction-allocation and no-quota models,
respectively (Table 1), for two reasons. First, some low productivity ￿rms that
do not get quotas under auction allocation recieve them under political allocation
because they have a high κ (i.e., high political connections). Second, the export
market shares of some high-productivity ￿rms under political allocation are lower
than they would be under auction allocation because they have a low κ.
Our results indicate that 18 percent ((3.43-3.26)/(4.21-3.26)) of the gain from
removing quotas is due to the removal of misallocation (e.g., replacement of po-
litical allocation with auction allocation), while 82 percent is due to the direct
removal of the quota (movement from auction allocation to no quota). 30 If we
28κ = ρφ +
√
(1 − ρ2)ϵ: ϵ is a standard normal and ρ is the correlation between φ and κ.
29Because there are more ￿rms in the model than the data, we group the NPA ￿rms in the
model evenly into bins so that the number of bins in the model equals the number of ￿rms in
the data. The group of ￿rms with the highest κ receive the highest market share, the group with
the next highest κ receives the second highest market share, and so forth. The empirical market
share assigned to each bin in the model is divided evenly across its constituent ￿rms.
30Similar results are obtained using a Pareto distribution for ￿rm productivity, in which case
26apply this decomposition to the productivity calculation in Table 8, it implies that
the removal of the actual licensing institution increased exporters’ productivity by
1.3 percentage points (0.07*0.18). Put di￿erently, we ￿nd that removing misallo-
cation increases exporter productivity an additional 28 percent ((4.21-3.26)/3.26
vs (4.21-3.43)/3.43) versus auction allocation.
This e￿ect of misallocation can be placed in context by noting that Hsieh and
Klenow (2009) calculate TFP gains of 23 to 30 percent from removing all domestic
distortions from Chinese manufacturing in 2005. Our analysis indicates removal of
China’s textile and clothing quota licensing regime by itself would increase TFP
among exporters by 5.2 percent (3.43/3.26). Given the myriad other distortions
that likely exist in Chinese manufacturing, our estimate seems plausible.
7 Subcontracting
7.1 Subcontracting by Producing Firms
Our estimates are sensitive to unobserved subcontracting. More precisely, if the
quota-holding ￿rm and the ultimate producer of the export are di￿erent, and if
customs documents list the name of the former rather than the latter, then our
estimates of extensive-margin activity following quota removal will be biased up-
wards if subcontractors o￿cially replace quota holders on trade documents starting
in 2005. Furthermore, assignment of subcontracts on the basis of e￿ciency (for
example, via a black-market auction) would complicate our ability to identify a
reallocation of exports towards more e￿cient ￿rms when the MFA ended.
In principle, subcontracting’s in￿uence on our results should be minimal given
its illegality. Unfortunately, as noted in Section 3, we have been unable to de-
termine via interviews or secondary sources the extent to which it might have
occurred. Nevertheless, ￿ve trends in the data suggest that subcontracting exerts
a limited e￿ect on our results.
we ￿nd a shape parameter of 4.5, τChn;US = 1.7, τUS;Chn = 3.05, fChn;US/fChn;Chn = 1.75,
fUS;Chn/fUS;US = 1.05 and rank correlation ρ = 0.70. Given these parameters, weighted-
average productivity under political allocation, auction allocation and no quotas is 2.36, 2.54,
and 3.61, implying that 14 percent of the gain from removing quotas is due to the elimination of
misallocation.
27First, if quota holders were subcontracting to e￿cient non-quota holders, one
might expect these subcontractors to be dominated by a relatively small number
of large (i.e., e￿cient) producers, and that these producers would dominate entry
once quotas are removed. Instead, as noted in footnote 21 in Section 5.2, we ￿nd
that new MFA entrants in 2005 are relatively numerous and relatively small.
Second, if subcontracting were the only way a ￿rm with a quota could ful￿ll
it, the ￿rms relying on subcontractors in 2004 would exit or shrink substantially
once quotas were removed. In fact, we ￿nd that few incumbents’ exports actually
decline from 2004 to 2005, and that MFA exit rates are relatively low compared
with OTC exit rates across all ownership types (Table 5). 31
Third, we ￿nd that 86 percent of the quota-holding MFA exporters in 2004
are also active in similar products destined for other markets. Given that these
￿rms are present in these other markets, they likely have the ability to produce
for MFA as well. (Subcontracting exports of textile and apparel goods to other
markets makes little sense given that they were not constrained by quotas). It is
therefore not obvious why a quota-holder would subcontract production of MFA
but produce its own output of similar products for exports to other destinations. 32
Fourth, we ￿nd little evidence in the NBS production data that textile and
clothing producers’ exports exceeded their production, as might be expected if they
were on-exporting subcontractors’ output. In both 2004 and 2005, the production-
to-export ratio is greater than one for 95 percent of ￿rms that report textile and
apparel as their main line of business. One caveat here is that information revealed
by the production-to-exports ratio depends on the relative importance of the export
market; ￿rms selling large quantities domestically might nevertheless export a
relatively small amount of subcontracted production.
Finally, we ￿nd a relatively strong contribution by the extensive margin in
￿processing￿ versus ￿ordinary￿ exports, where the former refers to exports that
are assembled in an export processing zone with a disproportionate share of raw
materials that are imported at reduced or often zero tari￿ rates. Subcontracting
31While it is true that SOEs’ market shares decline substantially, this reallocation is driven by
faster growth among privately owned ￿rms than SOEs, i.e., almost all incumbents experienced
growth in export quantity between 2004 and 2005.
32As discussed in Section 3, virtually all MFA products had full trading rights so all ￿rms could
directly export an MFA product to the rest of the world if they so chose.
28of processed exports is more di￿cult, especially for subcontractors that lie outside
the processing zone, given that the rules governing this class of exports must be
obeyed by the subcontractor.33 Table 9 compares the relative contribution of the
extensive margin in MFA versus OTC exports for processed versus all exports. We
￿nd that MFA incumbents lose more relative market share in processing exports
(-21.7 percent) than in all exports (-16.7 percent), and a similar reallocation away
from SOEs.
7.2 Subcontracting by Intermediaries
Unobserved subcontracting by intermediaries (i.e., non-producing ￿trading￿ ￿rms)
presents a di￿erent challenge to identi￿cation than subcontracting by producers:
while the latter had no reason to continue once the quota institution ended, there
is no reason for the former to disappear. Furthermore, even if the number of in-
termediaries remained constant between 2004 and 2005, the number of producing
￿rms with which they contracted ￿ and, therefore, their in￿uence on the ￿true￿ ad-
justment of China’s extensive and intensive margins ￿ would be unknown because
we do not observe the set of producers from which an intermediary sources.
One might expect trading ￿rms to be replaced by producers in 2005 if quota-
rich trading ￿rms were an important conduit for quota-poor producers’ goods. In
fact, we ￿nd relatively strong entry by ￿trading ￿rms￿, de￿ned as in Ahn et al.
(2011) as ￿rms with the words ￿importer￿, ￿exporter￿ or ￿trader￿ in their title,
in MFA versus OTC between 2004 and 2005. One reason for this growth that is
consistent with our conclusions above but which contributes to an under-estimation
of the in￿uence of the extensive margin, is that intermediaries helped a new set of
low-productivity entrants overcome the ￿xed costs of exporting once quotas were
removed (Ahn et al. 2011). One caveat associated with this conclusion is that
our classi￿cation of ￿rms as trading companies is imperfect, and, in particular,
might result in ￿rms that have both production and trading arms being classi￿ed
as traders. A large fraction of the textile and clothing apparel SOEs that export,
for example, are classi￿ed as traders, which is at odds with the evidence presented
above that virtually all SOEs in the NBS production data have higher production
33We identify processed exports via a ￿ag in the customs data. Processed exports account for
19 and 20 percent of MFA exports in 2004 and 2005, respectively.
29output than exports. Indeed, according to our classi￿cation, trading companies
account for 48 and 46 percent of OTC and MFA exports in 2004, which is quite
large relative to the 24 percent share of intermediaries in China’s overall exports.
We suspect that state-owned manufacturers may export through trading arms
of their production facilities under a name that contains the phrases ￿importer￿,
￿exporter￿ or ￿trader￿. This may be why we are only able to match 9 percent of
state-owned textile and clothing exporters in the customs and production data by
name even though the production data contains a census of SOEs.
Given our concern of classifying these state-owned clothing and apparel ex-
porters as intermediaries, we investigate the e￿ects of treating all SOEs as pro-
ducers. We ￿nd that as a result of this reclassi￿cation, the export share of the
remaining ￿rms classi￿ed as traders falls to 13 and 11 percent, respectively. This
result suggests that although intermediaries help facilitate trade in this industry,
their role is relatively small, perhaps because the U.S., E.U. and Canada are rela-
tively large markets which makes direct exports pro￿table.
8 Conclusion
We evaluate the productivity gains associated with a speci￿c trade liberalization,
the removal of quotas on Chinese textile and clothing exports to the U.S., E.U. and
Canada in 2005. We ￿nd that quota removal coincides with substantial reallocation
of export activity from incumbents to entrants, and show that this reallocation is
inconsistent with an ex ante assignment of quotas by the Chinese government on
the basis of ￿rm productivity. As a result, we ￿nd that the standard productivity
growth expected from the removal of this trade barrier is magni￿ed by the con-
comitant elimination of the institutions that grew up around it. Our counterfactual
analysis suggests that productivity growth from quota removal is 27 percent higher
than it would be if quotas had been allocated according to ￿rm e￿ciency.
Our analysis provides intuition for why empirical ￿ndings of the productivity
gains from trade (e.g., Feyrer 2009 and Pavcnik 2002) are often large compared to
the relatively modest gains predicted by many trade models (Arkolakis et al. 2010).
While theoretical models typically presume an e￿cient allocation of resources,
conditional on trade barriers, institutions that evolve to manage them are subject
30to corruption or capture, imposing additional distortions. Because reforming these
institutions can be politically di￿cult, externally mandated reforms that dismantle
them can deliver outsized gains.
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$#￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿1￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$0￿￿￿￿￿￿






￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ !" ￿￿￿ #￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿$% ￿￿￿￿% ￿￿ !￿











Table 5: Decomposition of Absolute and Relative 2004 to 2005 Changes in MFA
Market Share
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
￿!!￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿"# ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿$￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿'
￿%￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿&( ￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿"￿ ￿￿￿￿￿*
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿,￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿￿(￿￿￿￿&￿￿'￿0￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿!￿￿￿￿1￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿3￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿￿(￿￿￿￿&￿￿'￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿





36Table 6: Decomposition of Absolute and Relative 2004 to 2005 Changes in MFA
Prices
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ !￿ ￿￿"
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ !￿ ￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿$
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿%￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ !￿ ￿#￿
￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿'￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ !￿ ￿￿" ￿ ￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿#( ￿ ￿￿"
%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿)￿￿%!'￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ !￿ ￿#"
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ !￿ ￿##








Table 7: Decomposition of Absolute and Relative Changes in MFA Quality
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿!
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿$￿ ￿￿￿￿%￿ ￿￿￿￿%# ￿￿￿￿￿&
￿'￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿&) ￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿%+ ￿￿￿￿#
"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿"￿(￿ ￿￿￿&+ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿+) ￿￿￿￿%* ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿%%
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿*￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿&￿








37Table 8: Decomposition of Absolute and Relative 2004 to 2005 Changes in MFA
Quality-Adjusted Prices
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿%￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ & ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿
#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿'￿￿#￿%￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿"
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ( ￿￿￿￿)









Table 9: Decomposition of 2004 to 2005 Changes in Relative MFA Market Share,
Processing Exports
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
￿!!￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿"# ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿$# ￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿' ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿$( ￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿"￿ ￿￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿$% ￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿") ￿￿￿￿'
+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿' ￿￿￿￿￿
+￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿"* ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿,￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿(￿￿￿￿$￿￿'￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿(￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+/￿0￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿!￿￿￿￿1￿￿￿





















.0625 .125 .5 1 2 8 16 32
Ratio
SOE Domestic Foreign
First and ninety-ninth percentiles are dropped from each distribution. Collective firms are excluded.
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39Figure 4: MFA Export Prices Relative to the Average Export Price Across All
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40A Appendix (Numerical Solutions)
In this appendix, we provide further detail on Irarrazabal et. al (2010) and our
procedures for solving the model numerically.
There is one industry and two countries, although this is easily generalized to
multiple countries and multiple industries. A representative consumer maximizes








Firms face three types of costs. The ￿rst two are the standard: ad valorem tari￿s
(τod) and ￿xed costs of production (fod). In order to export a quota-bound good
from origin country o to destination country d, ￿rms must also pay a license fee
(aod > 0) per unit exported. This quota license fees is equivalent to per-unit
increases in the cost of exporting.
Firm productivity is drawn from the distribution G(φ) with density g(φ). The











where σ > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution across varieties and ωo is the













where Pd and Yd are the price index and expenditure in the destination market,
respectively. The license price that equates the aggregate demand for exports with
the size of the quota is determined (endogenously) by a Walrasian auctioneer.
This model assumes that the total mass of potential entrants in each country
is proportional to a country’s income. Since there is no free entry, net pro￿ts are
pooled and redistributed to consumers in country o who own ωo of a diversi￿ed
global fund. Total income in each country is Yo = ωoLo(1 + π) where π is the
dividend per share of the global fund. The pro￿ts for country o’s active ￿rms
selling to market d areπod =
podqod
















where foo is the ￿xed cost of production in the home pro￿t equation and fod is the
￿xed cost of exporting from o to d.
Firms enter a market if there are positive pro￿ts. The marginal exporter earns























where Pd = Pd(φ∗
od). Given φ∗









Since there is no closed form solution to the price index when aod > 0, we must
solve the model numerically. Our solution modi￿es the algorithm described in Irar-
razabal et al (2010) to account for an endogenous license price. The parameters are:
σ, L = LChn,LUEC, G(φ) ∼ lnℵ(µ,θ), τ = {τChn,Chn,τChn,UEC,τUEC,Chn,τUEC,UEC},
f = {fChn,Chn,fChn,UEC,fUEC,Chn,fUEC,UEC}, ω = {ωChn,ωUEC}. Below we ex-
plain how the parameters are chosen. Given the parameters, we can numerically





P = {PChn,PUEC}, Y = {YChn,YUEC},π and aChn,UEC (we assume that China does
not impose quotas on U.S. goods).
We solve two versions of the model. The ￿rst version does not impose quotas
on China’s exports to the U.S. (the ￿no quota￿ equilibrium). In this scenario,
aChn,UEC = 0. In the ￿e￿cient allocation￿ equilibrium, the license price is non-
negative and depends on the restrictiveness of the quotas that we calculate from
the data.
We solve the model with one million ￿rms drawn from the productivity distri-
bution.The Matlab code used to generate these results, available in our electronic
42appendix, is a modi￿ed version of the code used in Irarrazabal et al. (2010), gra-
ciously provided by Andreas Moxnes. Superscripts denoting the iteration round:
1. Choose a starting value for the license price a0
od. (In the ￿no quota￿ equilib-
rium, we set a0
od = 0.).
2. Choose a starting value for the price indexes, P 0.
3. Simultaneously solve for the dividend per share in equation (A.15) and the
cuto￿s φ∗ in equation (A.17). This involves solving ￿ve unknowns with ￿ve
equations. First choose a candidate π and then compute the cuto￿s in (A.17).
Given the candidate φ∗, compute π and re-compute the cuto￿s, iterating until
convergence is achieved. This process determines the cuto￿s φ0∗ given the
candidate P 0 in step 2.
4. Compute the price indexes in (A.18).
5. Iterate over steps 3 and 4. The equilibrium values of {φ∗,P} are found
when ∥P r − P r−1∥ is minimized. The values of Y and π are determined
once {φ∗,P}are known. In the ￿no quota￿ equilibrium, stop here and com-
pute aggregate exports from China to the US. In the ￿e￿cient allocation￿
equilibrium, continue to step 6.
6. Compare aggregate exports from China to the U.S. with exports under ￿no
quota￿ equilibrium multiplied by the quota restrictiveness. Iterate on steps
1-5 until this di￿erence is minimized.
We impose values for some parameters and choose values for the remaining pa-
rameters by gridding over them and comparing their solutions to the data. We
assume that the two countries have identical sizes LUEC = LChn = 100. We choose
an elasticity of substitution, σ = 4, that is the median among the apparel and
textiles elasticities estimated in Broda et al. (2006). We assume a log normal
productivity distribution, G(φ) ∼ lnℵ(µ,θ). We assume iceberg trade costs are
equal to 1 within countries, (τChn,Chn = τUS,US = 1). We assume domestic ￿xed
costs of production are low enough to allow all ￿rms to produce and set them to
fChn,Chn = fUEC,UEC = 2x10−6. We set the wage in each country equal to unity;
although this assumption appears strong, it simply implies that that the iceberg
and ￿xed trade costs that we match to the data capture variation in wages as well
as trade costs. Although this assumption appears strong, it simply implies that
43the iceberg and ￿xed trade costs that we match to the data capture variation in
wages as well as trade costs.
We jointly choose the remaining parameters ￿ the log normal mean and stan-
dard deviation, the two iceberg trade costs ( τChn,UEC and τUEC,Chn) and the ratios
of exporting to domestic ￿xed costs (fChn,UEC and fUEC,Chn) ￿ to match the fol-
lowing features of the data: the 75th, 90th, 95th, 99th and 99.9th percentiles of
the distribution of exports among Chinese textile and clothing exporters, the share
of Chinese textile and clothing producers that export and the Chinese and U.S.
market shares of U.S. and Chinese textile and clothing consumption in 2005, re-
spectively. China’s NBS production data reports that 44 percent of ￿rms in the
textile and clothing sectors (Chinese Industrial Classi￿cations 17 and 18) exported
in 2005. The share exports accounted for by the {75th,90th,95th,99th,99.9th} per-
centiles of these exporters is {0.26,0.46,0.59,0.80,0.93}. According to textile and
clothing production and trade data in the Annual Survey and Chinese customs
data, respectively, the U.S. market share of Chinese textile and clothing (China
Industrial Classi￿cation codes 17 and 18) consumption is 1.2 percent. According to
the NBER Productivity Database, the Chinese market share of U.S. apparel and
textile consumption (NAICS codes 313, 314 and 315) is 13.1 percent. All data are
from 2005 because that is the ￿rst post-quota year. The resulting parameters are
µ = 1.29, θ = 0.58, τChn,UEC = 1.80, τUEC,Chn = 3.55, fChn,UEC/fChn,Chn = 1.15
and fUEC,Chn/fUEC,UEC = 1.15. The model matches the moments we target well:
The share exports accounted for by the {75th,90th,95th,99th,99.9th} percentiles
is {0.32,0.52,0.65,0.84,1}; 44 percent of the simulated Chinese ￿rms export and
they have a 13.5 percent market share in the U.S.; and 8 percent of the simulated
U.S. ￿rms export and have a 1.2 percent market share in China. The sum of the
squared deviations between model and data in percentage terms is 0.43.
Finally, we need one more parameter, the quota restrictiveness, to solve the
￿e￿cient allocation￿ simulation. According to the data, the median growth of
Chinese exports of quota-restricted goods relative to unrestricted goods was 155
percent in 2005 relative to 2004. This implies a quota restrictiveness of 0.61 (1-
1/2.55).34
34This 155 percent growth rate is relative to quota-unconstrained textile and clothing exports
as well as to export growth of both types of exports in 2004, i.e., a ￿triple￿ di￿erence that is
explained in greater detail in Section 4.3. We assume this measure of quota restrictiveness is
44B Appendix (Empirical Results)
Table 10 contains the underlying regression output for the results reported in Table
5. Table 11 contains the underlying regression output for the results reported in
Table 6. Table 12 contains the underlying regression output for the results reported
in Table 7. Table 13 contains the underlying regression output for the results
reported in Table 8.
independent of whether quotas are allocated e￿ciently or ine￿ciently in 2004.
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